Is There No Such Thing as a Reverse Discrimination Claim Now?

On June 5, 2025, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its opinion regarding whether an individual in a majority group must submit additional “background circumstances” in order to prove a prima facie case under Title VII’s disparate treatment provisions. Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, 605 U.S. __(2025). Justice Jackson, in writing the opinion for a unanimous court, held that the requirement for additional “background circumstances” evidence in some federal circuit courts for reverse discrimination claims is not “consistent with Title VII’s text or our case law construing the statute.” Rather, Title VII’s disparate treatment provision “draws no distinctions between majority-group plaintiffs and minority-group plaintiffs.” 605 U.S. – (2025).

In Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, Ms. Ames, a heterosexual woman, worked for the Ohio Department of Youth Services (“the Agency”) in various roles beginning in 2004. In 2019, the Agency interviewed her for a new management position, but ultimately hired a lesbian woman. The Agency subsequently demoted her from her role as a Program Administrator, and later hired a gay man to replace her in that role. Ms. Ames filed a lawsuit against the Agency under Title VII, alleging that she was not promoted and was demoted because of her heterosexual orientation.

The federal district court granted summary judgment to the Agency, and Ms. Ames appealed to the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Ms. Ames failed to meet her burden to show “background circumstances” that could support the suspicion that the Agency was an “unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.” 87 F 4th 822, 825. Under existing Sixth Circuit precedent, Ames, as a straight woman, was required to make this showing, “in addition to the usual ones for establishing a prima facie case.” Id.

A prima facie case is the first step of the three-step inquiry for proving a Title VII disparate treatment discrimination claim. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973). In that first step, the plaintiff bears the burden of producing enough evidence to support an inference of discriminatory motive for the adverse employment action. This burden, however, is not an onerous one and can be met by evidence that the plaintiff applied for a job for which she was qualified, that the position was available, and that her application was rejected under circumstances giving rise “to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” The Sixth Circuit added the additional background circumstances requirement for majority-group plaintiffs as part of the burden in 1985.

The Supreme Court disagreed, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case back to the federal district court for the application of the proper prima facie standard. In making this decision, the Supreme Court held that the background circumstances rule “cannot be squared with the text of Title VII or our [the Supreme Court’s] longstanding precedents.”

The Supreme Court first noted that the plain language of Title VII’s disparate treatment provision draws no distinction between majority-group plaintiffs and minority-group plaintiffs. The anti-discrimination language applies to “any individual.” 42 U.S.C.§2000e-2(a)(1). With this language, there is no room to impose a special requirement on majority plaintiffs, such as the Sixth Circuit’s requirements for evidence of unusual background circumstances.

Second, the Supreme Court looked to precedent cases to reinforce this interpretation. For instance, in the 1971 case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the court held that “discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed” in Title VII. Id. at 431 (emphasis added). Furthermore, in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), the Supreme Court cited favorably the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s view that Title VII bars discrimination “against whites on the same terms as racial discrimination against non-whites.” Id. at 279.

The Supreme Court noted that while the facts vary from case to case, the law makes it clear that under Title VII disparate treatment claims, the burden of proof does not vary based on whether the plaintiff is a minority or not. Accordingly, “reverse” discrimination claims may become a thing of the past, as any disparate treatment claim under Title VII is just a plain claim for discrimination.